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A reason justifying the exclusionary rule against prior negotiations in the interpretation of 
contracts1is its longevity.2Yet, the authorities commonly cited in support of the exclusionary 
rule are mostly traceable to Lord Wilberforce’s speech in the relatively recent case ofPrenn v 
Simmonds.3This article suggests that the law took a wrong turn in that case and caused later 
courts to support the exclusionary rule by recourse to policy-oriented justifications, instead of 
principle-based ones.4The emphasis on policy-oriented justifications,5and the recantation 
ofPrenn v Simmondsas reason enough for the exclusionary rule, support an independent rule 
against prior negotiations that was never meant to be.The consequence is the judicial6(and 
academic7) acknowledgement of the exclusionary rule’s uncertain boundaries, and the sim-
ultaneous maintenance of its legitimacy.*361 8 
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This article is divided into three parts. The first part, which is the focus of this article, makes the 
case for a historical misstep in the judicial understanding of the exclusionary rule.It will be 
shown that the exclusion of prior negotiations was originally a facet of the parol evidence rule. 
However, this exclusion then became detached from its evidentiary basis and evolved into an 
independent rule, a process which started withA & J Inglis v John Buttery & Co9and became 
greatly strengthened followingPrenn v Simmonds.For completeness, the second part of this 
article looks at the present-day consequences of this misstep.Even if it is accepted that the 
misstep does not prevent the common law from developing the exclusionary rule inde-
pendently, it will be shown that such development is unprincipled.The last part of this article 
looks to the future: from the historical context and present-day application of the exclusionary 
rule, it will be argued that the principle-based justifications for the exclusion of prior negotia-
tions are narrow.There is no independent exclusionary rule against prior negotiations.Prior 
negotiations are still sometimes excluded in contractual interpretation, but this is not as a 
consequence any exclusionary rule specific to them. Rather, they are excluded because of 
broader principles underpinning the interpretation enterprise. 
 
The past—wrong turns by misunderstanding the historical justifications for the exclu-
sionary rule 
 
Historical justifications for excluding prior negotiations 
 
The exclusionary rule as a facet of the parol evidence rule 
 
Historically, the exclusion of prior negotiations in contractual interpretation was regarded as a 
facet of the parol evidence rule.10In other words, prior negotiations were not excluded on the 
basis of their status alone.Instead, they were generally admissible to ascertain the aim and 
object of the contract; this was acknowledged as early as 1835 inReay v Richardson.11In that 
case, a previous conversation was held admissible to explain the motive that induced the 
plaintiff to enter into a compromise agreement with the defendant.Parke B held that the evi-
dence of the conversation was not to add to or qualify the terms of the agreement, but to show 
with what view the agreement was written.12 
 
Extrinsic evidence inadmissible to add to, vary or subtract from written document 
 
There were two separate but related reasons for the exclusion of prior negotiations as a facet of 
extrinsic evidence in the 19th century.13Indeed, as Carter notes, most of the judicial formula-
tions of the parol evidence rule spoke of evidence to "add*362 to, vary or subtract from" the 
document, whereas others spoke of the rule in relation to what the contract meant.14They both 
related to the belief that the final agreement embodied the parties’ assent and so should be 
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superior to anything else.15The first related to that aspect of the parol evidence rule of not 
adding, varying or subtracting from the final agreement.16The rule is stated as such17: 
 
"Parol testimony shall not be received, even toaddto a written agreement, a term or stipulation 
orally agreed by them before, or at the time the bargain was reduced into writing, to be parcel of 
the written instrument, but not introduced therein; for this would be in effect to alter such 
agreement." 
 
By this formulation, prior negotiations would be excluded together with all other extrinsic 
evidence if they were being used to "add, subtract or vary" the contract.The exclusion of prior 
negotiations on this basis did not affect its exclusion (or inclusion) when used for contractual 
interpretation.Indeed, it was said that while the writing cannot be departed from, one might 
"argue touching the operation thereof".18The test, it seems, is whether the evidence explains 
the language used or "labours under the objection of introducing something repugnant to or 
inconsistent with the tenor of the written instrument".19 
 
However, the imprecise meaning of "adding, varying or subtracting" from the final agreement 
meant that prior negotiations were sometimes excluded even though they were being used to 
interpret the contract.InThe Countess of Rutland’s Case,20Sir John Popham CJ explained that 
"every contract or agreement ought to be dissolved by matter of as high a nature as the first 
deed" and that: 
 
"It would be inconvenient, that matters in writing made by advice and on consideration, and 
which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the parties should be controlled by 
averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory."21 
 
The averment to "slippery memory" potentially excluded prior negotiations used for contrac-
tual interpretation.If the accuracy of the prior negotiations is in doubt, then, going by this 
reasoning, not only should they be inadmissible to vary the final agreement, but also to explain 
that agreement. Indeed, some treatises of the*363 time readThe Countess of Rutland’s Caseas 
supporting the exclusion of prior negotiations to interpret the contract.22However, this by no 
means represented the then-orthodoxy; indeed, notwithstanding this potentially extended reach 
of this aspect of the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence was generally excluded on the basis 
that it "added, subtracted or varied" the contract. 
 
Extrinsic evidence inadmissible to explain written document except in latent ambiguity 
 
Prior negotiations were also excluded as part of the general principle that "it is not permitted to 
interpret what has no need of interpretation".23This rested upon the belief that words have 
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fixed meanings, such that a party who has used clear and unambiguous language will be held to 
all that naturally follows from a direct and plain understanding of such language.24It was only 
when a term was susceptible to several meanings25that recourse could be had to the relevant 
context in order to discover the parties’ true intentions.26This principle is derived from Lord 
Bacon’s maxim that where an ambiguity is made apparent only by what is extrinsic to the 
writing, it must be corrected by extrinsic evidence.27Although some cases treated this princi-
ple as being distinct from the parol evidence rule,28it was later regarded as part of the parol 
evidence rule.29 
 
According to this understanding of the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence, including prior 
negotiations, was not admissible toexplainthe contract unless there was latent ambiguity.Latent 
ambiguity is distinguished from patent ambiguity, which is incurable.30Leaving aside criti-
cisms of this distinction,31where there was a latent ambiguity, "the actions of the partiespre-
vious to, and contemporaneous with, (but not subsequent to), the agreement, are admissible to 
explain it, by directing its application".32Thus inHughes v Statham,33letters written before an 
agreement were rejected because, as explained by Bayley J, the purpose of their admission 
"was not to show and explain any latent ambiguity, but to contradict*364 the plain meaning of 
the bargain".34The implication, however, is that had there been latent ambiguity, those letters, 
examples of prior negotiations, may have been properly admitted.35 
 
Indeed, the law reports are replete with examples showing prior negotiations being admitted to 
explain a latent ambiguity. For example, it was accepted inMacdonald v Longbottom36that 
extrinsic evidence may be admissible for the purpose of showing the subject-matter in a con-
tract.Specifically, a prior conversation between the parties was admissible in that case to con-
strue what "your wool" meant in the contract. According to Lord Campbell CJ, this evidence 
neither altered nor added to the written contract, but merely allowed the court to ascertain what 
the subject-matter referred to was.37Byles J held on appeal that the prior conversation was 
admissible so as to remove the latent ambiguity present in the contract.38Similarly, inSmith v 
Thompson,39prior correspondence between the parties was admitted to interpret a document 
by the defendant directing the plaintiff to use money remitted to him for "business purpos-
es".The justification for such admission was variously stated to be for the explanation of am-
biguous contractual terms.40 
 
Clear historical justifications 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the exclusion of prior negotiations was premised 
on two aspects of the parol evidence rule in the 19th century.Prior negotiations were excluded 
as part of the general prohibition against any variation of the written contract. Further, prior 
negotiations were excluded from being used to interpret the contract except where there was 
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latent ambiguity.41Unless one disagreed with the basis for the parol evidence rule,42the ex-
clusion of prior negotiations in the application of the parol evidence rule was not objectiona-
ble.At the very least, such exclusion was premised on clear justifications and guidelines.These 
justifications and guidelines were, however, to become muddled following wrong turns in 
subsequent cases. 
 
Wrong turns in history 
 
The case ofInglis v John Buttery Co 
 
The first wrong turn came with the 19th century case ofInglis.The issue in that case was 
whether a contract obliged shipbuilders to pay for extra new plating which was not contem-
plated specifically in the contract but which was required*365 to enable the ship to meet the 
classification concerned.The lower courts had considered the effect of a deleted sentence in the 
contract, an approach that was rejected by all members of the House of Lords.However, each 
differed somewhat as to the exact reason why. 
 
Lord Gordon’s speech was the shortest and he expressed agreement with Lord Gifford’s view 
of the law in the court below that43: 
 
"It is quite fixed, and no more wholesome or salutary rule relative to written contracts can be 
devised, that where parties agree to embody, and do actually embody, their contract in a formal 
written deed, then in determining what the contract really was and really meant a Court must 
look at the formal deed and to that deed alone." 
 
This statement of the law was unfortunately incompatible with the prevailing law at the 
time.While it was correct that the parol evidence rule prohibited recourse to extrinsic evidence 
to ascertain "what the contract really was", it did not do the same with respect to what it "really 
meant".Lord O’Hagan’s speech proceeded along similar lines.He stated as a general rule that a 
contract, "perfect in itself",44could not be interpreted by "acts antecedent to it".45He then went 
on to say that prior negotiations could not be admitted at all and that the "contract must stand by 
itself: and must be construed according to its own words, and the provisions contained within 
its own four corners".46McLauchlan perceptively identifies Lord O’Hagan’s speech as a re-
flection of the exclusionary rule of today.47However, Lord O’Hagan did not refer to any au-
thority in support of this principle beyond the assertion that admission would be "contrary to 
reason and principle".48But the prevailing reason and principle of the time was that extrinsic 
evidence, including prior negotiations, could be admitted in the event of a latent ambigui-
ty.While Lord O’Hagan appeared to allude to the requirement of ambiguity when he referred to 
a contract that was "perfect in itself"49(and hence admitting of no ambiguity), his later state-
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ments—as McLauchlan rightly points out—are reminiscent of an independent exclusionary 
rule. 
 
Quite apart from the speeches already referred to, it was Lord Blackburn’s speech that became 
the most referred to subsequently.He said that recourse to deleted sentences—which he re-
garded as an instance of prior negotiations—was not correct because the formal contract su-
perseded all previous communications between the parties.50He likewise expressed full 
agreement with Lord Gifford’s view of the law.51Notwithstanding Lord Blackburn’s agree-
ment with Lord Gifford, it is arguable that Lord Blackburn’s principal objection to the lower 
court’s approach was not that the lower court admitted prior negotiations per se.Rather, it was 
because the lower court had made use of prior negotiations to be "placed in the position in 
which the parties stood before they signed".52This expression*366 admits of two possible 
meanings.The first is an objection of the lower court’s consideration of the parties’ declarations 
of intentions (as contained in the prior negotiations) to alter the written contract.The second is 
an objection of the lower court’s consideration of the background in which the parties found 
themselves (again, contained in the prior negotiations) to explain the contract.Out of these two 
possibilities, it seems unlikely that Lord Blackburn intended to jettison what he had said just a 
year earlier.In his well-known judgment inRiver Wear Commissioners v Adamson,53he said 
that contractual interpretation involved inquiring beyond the language and involved examining 
all relevant background.Moreover, since 1859,54it had been clear enough that evidence of 
mutually known facts may be admitted to identify the meaning of a descriptive term.Lord 
Blackburn’s objection was therefore not with the admission of prior negotiations for the in-
terpretation of contracts per se, but rather with the specific use of prior negotiations as being 
declarations of the parties’ intentions.55 
 
Finally, Lord Hatherley LC appeared to base his decision on the inadmissibility of extrinsic 
evidence where the plain meaning of the contractual words was clear.Indeed, he said that the 
contractual words are "so plain and simple as to require no aid of testimony specially to explain 
them".56 
 
On the foregoing analysis of the various judges’ speeches, the ratio ofInglisdoes not as strongly 
support the exclusionary rule as is commonly believed.More substantively, the error inIng-
lisappears to be a conflation of prior negotiations which "added, subtracted or varied" the 
contract (a complete exclusion), and those which "explained" the contract (a qualified exclu-
sion).Both Lords Gordon and O’Hagan ignored the qualified exclusion in favour of a complete 
exclusion, contrary to the prevailing authority of the time.This error led to the formulation of an 
independent exclusionary rule.57 
 
The significance ofIngliswas regarded differently by the treatises of the time, affecting the 
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subsequent development of the law.Some treatises promulgated the error that there is no dis-
tinction between variation and interpretation, illustrated most prominently by Chitty’s treatise, 
which regardedInglisas setting an absolute rule that, in construing a contract, "the Court [is not] 
entitled to look at what the parties thereto said or did whilst the matter was in negotia-
tion".58The case ofCumberland v Bowes59was cited as supporting this reading ofIng-
lis.60However,Cumberland v Bowesdid not support this reading ofInglis; rather, all that Jervis 
CJ said in that case was that he had "considerable doubt" whether it was correct to refer to 
alterations in the draft contract to interpret a contract.61The court did not see it as necessary to 
consider this question62and even if it had had to, it appears*367 that Jervis CJ’s doubt was 
premised on the extrinsic evidence being "contradictory".63Therefore, if it were necessary to 
explain Jervis CJ’s reasoning, it would have been perfectly reconcilable with the prevailing 
rule that extrinsic evidence, including prior negotiations, could not be admitted if they con-
tradicted, rather than explained, the contract.Furthermore, this broad reading ofInglisis incon-
sistent with other parts of Chitty’s treatise of the time.It continued to maintain that extrinsic 
evidence might be admissible to explain a contract where there was ambiguity, provided that 
the evidence was not being used to vary or contradict the contract.64The treatise also cited-
Macdonald v Longbottomas an example where evidence of a previous conversation may be 
considered in the interpretation of a contract,65which would not have been possible had-
Inglisintroduced an absolute bar against recourse to prior negotiations.These two inconsisten-
cies remained in later editions of Chitty’s treatise.66 
 
Shaw in his treatise took a similar view that prior negotiations were completely excluded in the 
interpretation of contracts,67although he did not citeInglisfor this proposition.Rather, he cit-
edThe Countess of Rutland’s Case68and Lord Abbot CJ’s statement inKain v Oldthat "if the 
contract be in the end reduced to writing, nothing which is not found in the writing can be 
considered as a part of the contract".69These demonstrate the confusion between prior nego-
tiations that contradict the contract, and those that merely explain it.The cases ofThe Countess 
of RutlandandKain v Oldboth concerned that aspect of the parol evidence rule which prohib-
ited admission of extrinsic evidence, including prior negotiations, to contradict the contract by 
"adding, subtracting or varying" it.They did not prohibit recourse to such evidence for the 
purpose of explaining the contract. That aspect of admissibility is instead controlled by the 
presence or absence of ambiguity.Yet, Shaw proposed the absolute exclusion of prior negoti-
ations in a section on "interpretation of obligations". 
 
Other treatises attempted to reconcileIngliswith the prevailing rule.For example, Addison’s 
treatise citedInglisas standing for the proposition that70: 
 
"But where there is a written contract, the meaning of which as it stands is clear and unam-
biguous, former correspondence between the parties cannot be considered for the purpose of 
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arriving at the intention of the parties, nor can words deleted from the document and initialed 
by the parties as deleted, be used for such purpose.*368 " 
 
This statement fromInglisdid not introduce an independent exclusionary rule. Rather, the ex-
clusion of prior negotiations was still premised on the underlying aspect of the parol evidence 
rule that looks to ambiguity.Indeed, on its narrower reading ofInglis, Addison’s treatise con-
tinued to includeMacdonald v Longbottomas illustrating the admissibility of prior corre-
spondence to ascertain the subject matter of the contract.71Anson’s treatise similarly adopted a 
narrower reading ofInglis, although it did not refer to the case.It instead regarded cases like-
Macdonald v Longbottomas examples involving latent ambiguity, in which "explanatory ev-
idence" is admissible.72It is submitted that this is the correct view based on the prevailing 
law.73Notwithstanding these arguments for a narrower reading ofInglis,Inglislaid the seeds for 




Despite the divergent treatment ofInglisby the treatises of the time, the courts did not appear to 
treatInglisas standing for an independent exclusionary rule against prior negotiations.Instead, 
the courts explained the rejection of prior negotiations in contractual interpretation on the basis 
that there was insufficient ambiguity to admit extrinsic evidence.For example, in the Privy 
Council decision ofBank of New Zealand v Simpson,74Lord Davey stated that "[e]xtrinsic 
evidence is always admissible, not to contradict or vary the contract, but to apply it to the facts 
which the parties had in their minds and were negotiating about".75The extrinsic evidence in 
that case included prior negotiations (including correspondences and a circular prepared by the 
respondent) between the parties.In allowing such evidence to be admitted, Lord Davey held 
that the words in question did not possess a fixed meaning and were susceptible to different 
meanings depending on the surrounding circumstances.This reasoning was clearly based on the 
finding of latent ambiguity that allowed for the admission of parol evidence, including prior 
negotiations, to explain the contract. 
 
Notwithstanding the case law, some treatises continued to assert a broad proposition that prior 
negotiations may not be looked at to construe the contract right beforePrennwas decided.A 
prominent example is Chitty’s treatise, where the relevant statement of law had now evolved to 
read:*369  
 
"In construing a contract the court is not entitled to look at what the parties thereto said or did 
whilst the matter was in negotiation."76 
 
Six cases were cited in support of this proposition, which, on closer examination, do not all 
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stand for such a broad rule.The first,Prison Commissioners v Middlesex Clerk of the 
Peace,77concerned the interpretation of a conveyance "upon trust … for the purposes of the 
Prison Act, 1865".One issue was whether minutes discussing the conveyance could be ad-
mitted to interpret the conveyance.While it is true that Jessel MR disallowed recourse to those 
minutes, the reason behind his decision can be predicated on the lack of ambiguity78rather than 
a broad view that all prior negotiations are inadmissible. First, although Jessel MR said that 
"the law is that whatever the negotiations may be that precede the purchase, still the parties to 
the conveyance are bound by it",79there is nothing particularly startling about this statement.It 
simply shows that contracting parties are bound by the final agreement reached.By contrast, the 
interpretation of that agreement is a different matter and may be assisted by recourse to ex-
trinsic evidence.The minutes concerned were not admitted in this case because the conveyance 
"in the most express terms, recites that the land was bought for the purposes of the Prison Act, 
1885".80There was simply no latent ambiguity present to justify the admission of extrinsic 
evidence, including prior negotiations (the minutes), to interpret the conveyance.The second 
case cited in support of a broad exclusionary rule,Leggott v Barrett,81may also be explained 
similarly.That case concerned the interpretation of a deed that had been signed following an 
executory contract agreed between the parties.The issue was whether the executory contract 
constrained the effect of the deed.James LJ stated clearly that82: 
 
"If the parties have made an executory contract which is to be carried out by a deed afterwards 
executed, the real completed contract between the parties is to be found in the deed, and that 
you have no right whatever to look at the contract … except for the purpose of construing the 
deed itself.You have no right to look at the contract either for the purpose of enlarging or di-
minishing or modifying the contract which is to be found in the deed itself." 
 
Leggott v Barrettis therefore explainable on the basis that extrinsic evidence (whether prior 
negotiations or not) is not admissible to "add, subtract or vary" the contract eventually reached 
and does not stand for any broader proposition.Indeed, James LJ’s statement quoted above 
expressly allows recourse to extrinsic materials to construe the final contract.Millbourn v 
Lyons,83another case cited in Chitty’s treatise, may be likewise explained. 
 
The next case ofMercantile Bank of Sydney v Taylor84can also be explained similarly.In that 
case, the appellants argued that prior negotiations should be*370 admitted to interpret a con-
tract which released a co-surety from a guarantee but which allegedly reserved rights against 
other co-sureties.The Privy Council rejected that contention.Lord Watson said that those prior 
negotiations could not be referred to "either for the purpose of adding a term to their written 
agreement, or of altering its ordinary legal construction".85This is rather different from a 
general rule that excludes recourse to prior negotiations altogether.Lord Watson’s statement 
excludes such recourse only where the prior negotiationsadd tothe contract or where there isno 
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latent ambiguitypresent.What is left unsaid is that if the legal construction of the contract is not 
"ordinary", then latent ambiguity would be present and would in turn permit recourse to prior 
negotiations. 
 
Another case cited,Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban DC,86concerned whether a cov-
ering letter qualifying a tender was incorporated into the tender.It was not about the admissi-
bility of prior negotiations to interpret a contract.If at all, the case rested on that aspect of the 
parol evidence rule that prohibits extrinsic evidence from adding, subtracting or varying the 
contract. 
 
In contrast, the last case cited,City and Westminster Properties (1934) v Mudd,87does support 
a broader reading ofInglis.While admitting that surrounding circumstances may be called in aid 
to interpret contracts,88Harman J held that neither "past history" nor deleted words in previous 
drafts may be referred to.The difficulty with this reading ofInglishas already been alluded to89; 
suffice it to say thatMuddwas the only case out of six cited in Chitty’s treatise that actually 
supported a broad reading ofInglis.The least that can be said is that the case law after Inglis did 
not uniformly support a broad exclusionary rule. 
 
The edition of Chitty’s treatise just beforePrennwas decided also citedNational Bank of Aus-
tralasia Ltd v J Falkingham & Sons90as a specific example where previous drafts were not 
admitted to interpret a final deed.91However, that case did not stand for such a broad propo-
sition.On the facts, the drafts were not admitted to "alter its [the final deed’s] language; still less 
to explain or assist in the interpretation of the deed as finally executed".92While the second 
part of this sentence may support a broad exclusionary rule, the fact is that the court went on to 
say that the "legal effect of the deed appears … to be quite plain up to a certain 
point".93Accordingly, the drafts were not admitted to interpret the deed simply because there 
was no latent ambiguity present.This is aptly supported by other parts of the treatise that cit-
edShore v Wilsonto the effect that: 
 
"Where the words of any written instrument are free from ambiguity … evidencedehorsthe 
instrument, for the purpose of explaining it according to the surmised or alleged intention of the 
parties, is utterly inadmissible.*371 "94 
 
The case ofPrenn v Simmonds 
 
Thus, the state of the law at the timePrennwas decided did not, on balance, support an inde-
pendent exclusionary rule.The exclusion of prior negotiations, if at all, could still be explained 
on the basis of various aspects of the parol evidence rule. However,Prennwas to herald a ju-
dicial preference for an absolute prohibition of prior negotiations in contractual interpretation. 
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Prennmainly concerned the interpretation of a profit trigger in an option to purchase shares.The 
dispute was whether "profits" concerned simply the profits of the principal company, or 
whether it encompassed group profits, including those of subsidiary companies.95Lord Wil-
berforce, in a speech that has since become one of the longstanding English authorities against 
the admissibility of prior negotiations, said that prior negotiations could not be admitted be-
cause of "unhelpfulness", rather than "technical" reasons or "convenience".96However, as 
McMeel perceptively notes, Lord Wilberforce in his speech also acknowledged the supposed 
"utility" of previous documents to ascertain an interpretation that "completely frustrates" the 
object of the contract, but then went on to say that such negotiations are "unhelpful".There is 
therefore a tension between limited use and complete uselessness and, as McMeel points out, 
Lord Wilberforce seems to have equated the two rather too quickly.McMeel further notes 
thatPrennis not as strong an authority for the exclusionary rule because Lord Wilberforce 
acknowledged that prior negotiations could be taken into account if they supply a commercial 
purpose or aim for the agreement.97Elsewhere, McLauchlan notes that the reasons advanced 
by Lord Wilberforce inPrennare "unconvincing", and goes on to cite examples of cases in 
which prior negotiations were in fact helpful.98Notwithstanding these concerns,Prennwas 
cited in treatises as a determinative authority for the exclusionary rule.99A further point that 
may be made, in light of the discussion above, is that the authorities beforePrenndid not support 
an exclusionary rule andPrennmust therefore be judged on its own substantive reason-
ing.However, given the problems identified,Prenncannot itself be regarded as a reasoned au-
thority for the exclusionary rule. 
 
Consequences leading to present day 
 
Two consequences flowed fromPrennand what had gone on before.The first is that it heralded 
the rise of an independent exclusionary rule without understanding its proper justifica-
tions.Although Lord Wilberforce probably did not intend this consequence,100it did in fact 
result from the erosion in the distinction between the variation and interpretation of a con-
tract.Whereas extrinsic evidence that varied the contract was prohibited by the parol evidence 
rule, interpretation did not suffer from such an absolute prohibition.101Yet the two were con-
flated, leading to an*372 independent exclusionary rule.102The second consequence ofPrennis 
that it turned later courts towards policy-based justifications for the exclusionary rule.The 
combination of the vague justification of "unhelpfulness" advanced inPrenn, as well as the 
uncertain origins of the rule, led later courts to justify the exclusionary rule primarily based on 
policy, not principle.Cases subsequent toPrennthat simply citePrennas authority suffer from 
the same problem caused by these consequences since the historical support of the exclusion-
ary rule remains weak, and citation ofPrennmerely amplifies, and does not resolve, that 
weakness.103 
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The present—uncertain boundaries of exclusionary rule 
 
Two distinct understandings of exclusionary rule 
 
The above discussion of the past brings us to the present.We have seen that the historical basis 
of the exclusionary rule is not strong.That is a strong reason against the legitimacy of the rule 
based on its longevity, but it also shows why the subsequent development of the rule is un-
certain and unprincipled.Indeed, accompanying the rise of an independent exclusionary rule 
was the acknowledgement that its boundaries remain unclear.For example, inInvestors Com-
pensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society, Lord Hoffmann said that the bounda-
ries of the exclusionary rule "are in some respects unclear",104although he declined to explore 
them in the case itself.In the subsequent case ofChartbrook v Persimmon Homes, Lord 
Hoffmann accepted that the exclusionary rule did not always preclude evidence of previous 
communications between the parties, especially if such communications formed part of the 
background that explained what the parties reasonably meant by their language,105but did not 
explain exactly when this was the case, leading to continued uncertainty in the application of 
the exclusionary rule.106 
 
These acknowledgements are unsurprising given the questionable origins of the exclusionary 
rule.However, that alone is not sufficient to reject the exclusionary rule.Indeed, the present-day 
application of the exclusionary rule may be premised on some new justifications, justifying the 
departure from the rule’s historical backdrop.In understanding these new justifications, the 
present-day understandings of the rule must be canvassed.The first is to view the exclusionary 
rule as being very broad: it disallows the admission of prior negotiations in the interpretation of 
a contractin all cases.The second understanding is to view the exclusionary rule as applying 
only when prior negotiations are used for certain purposes, although it is not quite clear what 




Characteristics of broad version 
 
Cases followingPrennhave attributed a broad meaning to the exclusionary rule.For example, in 
the New Zealand case ofYoshimoto v Canterbury Golf International Ltd,107Thomas J thought 
that "the rule of evidence of pre-contractual negotiations is not receivable is seemingly abso-
lute".108By this understanding, prior negotiations are inadmissible because all extrinsic evi-
dence is inadmissible.An example where prior negotiations were inadmissible together with 
other extrinsic evidence isBanque Sabbag SAL v Hope,109where Mocatta J held that oral 
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evidence of what was said between the contracting parties could not be admitted in evi-
dence.110This understanding of the exclusionary rule, therefore, appears to be that prior ne-
gotiations are excluded because of their status as such. This is also illustrated byLep Air Ser-
vices v Rolloswin Ltd,111in which it was said that a contract cannot be construed by reference 
to negotiations leading thereto, although it is permissible to look at all the circumstanc-
es.112Exceptions113are, however, permissible in certain instances, such as to ascertain the 
"genesis and aim" of the contract,114as part of the "private dictionary" exception where a 
particular trade or community has its own unconventional or idiosyncratic linguistic us-
age,115and to "rectify" the contract without actually amounting to rectification.116 
 
Reasons for excluding prior negotiations under broad version 
 
There are several possible justifications specific117to the broad version that exclude prior 
negotiations in contractual interpretation.The first is that prior negotiations do not contain the 
relevant background.Contemporary learning tells us that contracts should be interpreted con-
textually, that is, with a consideration of all relevant factual background, which is very 
broad,118although there are limitations.The broad version of the exclusionary rule accounts 
for this particular learning by an almost irrebuttable presumption that prior negotiations never 
contain the relevant factual background.For example, inThe Lysland,119Ackner J rejected the 
evidence of negotiations leading up to the agreement concerned, although he also acknowl-
edged, in the very same sentence, that he must have regard to the factual background of the 
agreement, including its genesis and aim, when construing it.120This implies that prior nego-
tiations and the "genesis and aim" of the agreement are mutually exclusive, such that the 
former can never contain useful information about the*374 latter.However, this is not a con-
vincing justification: surely prior negotiationssometimescontain the relevant factual back-
ground. 
 
A second way of justifying the broad version is that prior negotiationsalwayscontain the par-
ties’ subjective intentions and are hence inadmissible.This answers the separate concern that 
contractual interpretation is an objective process, with the courts concerning themselves only 
with the manifested, rather than actual, intentions of the parties.Thus, inJones v Forest Fencing 
Ltd,121Chadwick LJ thought that the trial judge had fallen into error because he had asked 
himself what the purchaser would have understood from a reply he received from the agent 
acting on behalf of the vendor.He held that the correct approach was to ask what meaning 
should be given to the words used in the memorandum in light of known circumstances to the 
parties, but without regard to evidence of negotiation or of subjective intention.122This 
equates prior negotiations with the parties’ subjective intentions.This justification again suffers 
from being too broad: it is not always the case that prior negotiations contain the parties’ 
subjective intentions. 
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Characteristics of narrow version 
 
In contrast, there have been cases attributing a narrower understanding to the exclusionary 
rule.By this view, the exclusionary rule is not absolute.123This is best explained inBank of 
Scotland v Dunedin Property Investment Co Ltd (No.1)in the following terms124: 
 
"Certainly Lord Wilberforce proceeds to explain how the substance of negotiations must be 
excluded from questions of construction.However I do not think his Lordship meant this to be 
applied too rigidly.As he states (p 1385): ‘It may be said that previous documents may be 
looked at to explain the aims of the parties.In a limited sense this is true: the commercial, or 
business object, of the transaction, objectively ascertained, may be a surrounding fact.’" 
 
AfterChartbrook, there are cases that now regard this to be the correct understanding of the 
exclusionary rule.Thus inStena Line Ltd v Merchant Navy Ratings Pension Fund Trustees 
Ltd,125Briggs J held that the exclusionary rule operates, and excludes "evidence of the parties’ 
negotiations, at least for the purpose of identifying, as a relevant background fact, ‘a provi-
sional consensus which may throw light on the meaning of the contract which was eventually 
concluded’".126 
 
Reasons for excluding prior negotiations under narrow version 
 
There are principally two specific justifications supporting the narrow version of the exclu-
sionary rule.First, cases characterise the rule not as one barring admissibility*375 ofallprior 
negotiations, but only those that show the subjective intentions of the parties.While it is often 
the case that prior negotiations will correspond to the parties’ subjective intentions, this is not 
always the case.127For example, inPritchard v Briggs,128Goff LJ stated the rule as such: 
"[D]irect evidence of intention is not admissible nor are negotiations save as factual back-
ground."129There is here a parallel drawn between "direct evidence of intention" and "nego-
tiations", although that parallel is qualified to the extent that negotiations may sometimes 
contain evidence of "factual background", which are admissible.In more recent cases, the 
breadth of the exclusionary rule has been more carefully delimited.Thus inProforce Recruit Ltd 
v Rugby Group Ltd, two members of the Court of Appeal said that prior negotiations may be 
admitted in certain circumstances even when it was for the interpretation of the contract con-
cerned.Mummery LJ also accepted Lord Nicholls’s extrajudicial view that the exclusionary 
rule, as it is broadly understood, was too "rigid".130Mummery LJ appeared to accept that prior 
negotiations will only be inadmissible should they afford direct evidence of the parties’ actual 
J.B.L. 2014, 5, 360-387 Page 15 
  
(Cite as: ) 
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. 
intentions.131One plausible justification of the exclusionary rule is hence the prohibition 
against parties’ subjective intentions. 
 
Another way in which the exclusionary rule is justified in this narrow sense is by narrowing the 
definition of what constitutes a "negotiation" in the first place.InNew Hampshire Insurance Co 
Ltd v MGN Ltd, negotiations were defined as consisting of "one side proposing terms and the 
other rejecting them and proposing other terms, and matters like that".132Staughton LJ ap-
peared to accept that the exclusionary rule does not preclude admission of everything that was 
said or written from the time when the parties started the process of making a contract until 
they were about to place their signature on the final version so long as the document being 





The past and the present have afforded an exclusionary rule that is not properly justified.The 
broad version, which enunciates an absolute ban on prior negotiations, is unsupported by au-
thority since prior negotiations were never treated apart from other extrinsic evidence and 
excluded completely.Indeed, its possible justifications are too broad and do not represent the 
nature of prior negotiations.The narrow version, while much preferable to the broad version, 
requires the courts to draw impossible distinctions between classes of negotiations which are 
admissible, and those which are not, principally because its boundaries are unclear.133It seems, 
however, to be justified by the prohibition against parties’ subjective intentions but this justi-
fication has been overshadowed by other policy-oriented justifications.*376  
 
These problems, which have arisen from a disconnection between past and present, can only be 
rectified in the future by correcting the wrong turns made in history.The real problem is that an 
independent exclusionary rule that is specific to prior negotiations was never supported by 
history.It is far better to detach ourselves from the notion that there is such an exclusionary rule 
and examine the reasons why prior negotiations should be excluded, if at all, as part of broader 
principles underpinning contractual interpretation. 
 
The future—rectifying the wrong turns in history 
 
Choosing between principle and policy 
 
Two levels of justifications 
 
Assuming that it is correct that an independent exclusionary rule against prior negotiations is 
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unsupported by history, it remains to be examined just when prior negotiations should be ex-
cluded, if at all.In this regard, it is useful to see the justifications for the exclusion of prior 
negotiations on two different levels.134The more fundamental, or "primary" level, is con-
cerned with the proper way to interpret a legal document.At this level, the concern is not with 
"functional" reasons—such as those involving resources and time—but with foundational 
ones.These reasons are foundational or "primary" because they have to do with the core prin-
ciples of contractual interpretation.135As Mitchell states, the policy-oriented reasons must 
always be secondary to reaching the right result in the individual case on the basis of the evi-
dence.136 
 
A second, less fundamental, level of objection can simply be termed the "secondary" level.This 
is the level at which the debate is informed by more "pragmatic" or "policy-oriented" reasons, 
such as resources and time.137At this level, there is agreement or resolution at the primary 
level:assumingthat a particularapproachis to be adopted in the interpretation of a legal docu-
ment, ought certain specific practices flowing from the approach be rejected owing to such 
functional reasons?These reasons, as Mitchell puts it, "are not internally related to the sub-
stance of contract law at all, but are concerned with the efficient processing of contract disputes 
and contract litigation".138Thus, if a particular approach prescribes a "comprehensive" manner 
of interpreting legal documents, considerations of time and effort may preclude the law from 
accepting that all relevant documents be looked at.However, even in rejecting these other 
documents, the law does not reject the general approach. Instead, the general approach is ac-
cepted, if conditioned.*377  
 
Separating principle-based and policy-oriented justifications 
 
The debate surrounding the exclusion of prior negotiations does not disagree on the proper way 
to interpret contracts.139Contracts ought to be interpreted objectively and in such a way as to 
give effect to the parties’ intentions.Instead, the contemporary justifications are of the sec-
ondary or "functional" kind.Lord Nicholls, writing extra-judicially, has identified, without 
accepting, several of these justifications.First, it is said that the admission of prior negotiations 
would promote uncertainty and unpredictability in dispute resolution.140Secondly, the ad-
mission of prior negotiations may be detrimental to third parties.141This is a justification 
supported by Lord Steyn, who has written that the popularity of England as a legal forum 
means that the objectivity approach in contractual interpretation should be maintained so as to 
afford some commercial certainty to third parties.142Thirdly, the admission of prior negotia-
tions may increase the time and expense of trial.This is, again, a view shared by Lord 
Steyn143and Lord Bingham,144both writing extra-judicially.Fourthly, and as an umbrella 
factor stated by Lord Wilberforce inPrenn, prior negotiations are simply "unhelpful".The su-
premacy which policy-oriented reasons have over principle-based reasons in the modern jus-
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tification of the exclusion of prior negotiations received its strongest confirmation yet in-
Chartbook, where Lord Hoffmann maintained that it is reasons of policy that justify the rule 
and even helpful evidence will be excluded under it.145 
 
As discussed above, about the only convincing contemporary principle-based reason com-
monly advanced in support of the exclusion of prior negotiations is that the admission of prior 
negotiations would subvert the objective approach in contractual interpretation.146Thus, as 
Mason J said inCodelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South 
Wales,147the investigation of the actual intentions, aspirations or expectations of the parties 
before or at the time of contract would tend to give too much weight to these factors at the 
expense of the language of the written contract.148Lord Bingham has also written that any 
detailed consideration of such prior negotiations will lead to "excessive emphasis on what the 
parties wanted to agree and too little on what they actually did agree".149And inChartbrook, 
Lord Hoffmann explained the concern in similar terms.*378 150 
 
Understanding exclusion of prior negotiations in proper historical context: was the shift to an 
absolute rule justified? 
 
Are the "new" policy-oriented reasons warranted by modern circumstances? 
 
Much has been written about the flaws of the policy-oriented reasons justifying the exclusion 
of prior negotiations.151This article agrees with these criticisms by adding that the poli-
cy-oriented reasons never featured obviously in older decisions leading up toPrenn.There was 
never a concern that the admission of extrinsic evidence, including prior negotiations, would 
result in greater uncertainty in contractual interpretation cases, or that it would affect the rights 
of third parties.Neither was there an overt concern that the cost and time spent on litigation 
would increase. 
 
The former two reasons are not time-sensitive; either they exist or they do not, independent of 
time.Thus, it is not likely that any change in modern circumstances would account for their 
sudden emergence.Given that prior negotiations were previously admitted together with ex-
trinsic evidence to explain away latent ambiguities without any complaint of uncertainty, it is 
difficult to argue that the abolition of the present-day exclusionary rule would result in wide-
spread uncertainty.So long as the rules that inform contractual interpretation are open-textured, 
there will be some unavoidable uncertainty in the entire enterprise of interpretation. Likewise, 
if the admissibility of prior negotiations before did not give rise to concerns about third parties’ 
rights, then it ought not to be of concern now.As McLauchlan rightly points out, it is difficult to 
conceive of a specific situation where the admission of prior negotiations would adversely 
impact on third parties’ rights in a way that could not be avoided by the application of some 
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other legal doctrine.152Further, as Bayley notes, third parties are afforded little protection 
under the current law in any event and so a relaxation of the exclusion of prior negotiations is 
unlikely to expose them to additional risks.153The reason about increased cost and time should 
also not be taken too seriously.Even though the admissibility of prior negotiations was allowed 
without complaint in older times, it is undeniable that, measured in absolute terms, the scale of 
litigation has increased since then.However, the argument is a relative one: just as the scale of 
litigation has increased, so too have the resources available in response to that in-
crease.154Therefore, these reasons never supported anindependentexclusionary rule against 
prior negotiations. 
 
However, the principle-based reasons are not easily dismissed.Unlike the policy-oriented 
reasons which are not supported by the weight of history or present circumstances, the prin-
ciple-based reasons do have such support, even if not expressly alluded to by the courts.*379  
 




One principle-based reason for the exclusion of prior negotiations is said to be to exclude the 
consideration of parties’ subjective intentions.155As Lord Steyn has said156: 
 
"The real reason for the exclusion of such evidence is the philosophical starting point of Eng-
lish law: the purpose of the process of interpretation is not to find what the parties intended but 
to determine what the language of the contract would signify to an ordinary speaker of English, 
who is properly informed as to the objective setting of the contract.In relation to that enquiry 
evidence of the actual intentions of the parties, or rather their pre-contractual communications, 
is unhelpful." 
 
The starting point is that the English contractual interpretation approach is objective: that is, the 
search is not for what the partiesactuallyintended, but what they reasonably had intended.The 
objective principle157was neatly encapsulated in the words of Blackburn J in the oft-cited 
English decision ofSmith v Hughes.158However, objectivity is not pursued to the exclusion of 
the contracting parties.Indeed, another (and more important) aspect of "objectivity" concerns 
the relevance of the parties’ own intentions.One school of thought holds the parties’ own 
consideration to be completely irrelevant, such that it is not even permissible to consider what 
each respective party objectively thought.Such a proposition would lead to courts enforcing 
promises between two strangers because they, to all outward appearances, can reasonably be 
said to have come to an agreement.159This would certainly be undesirable.Thus it has been 
said, "surely there is something wrong with a theory which forces uponbothparties an agree-
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ment which neither of them wants".160Probably the more accepted level of objectivity in the 
English (and Commonwealth) context is not pitched at so high a level.It is permissible for the 
court to objectively consider what the parties understood from their respective perspec-
tives.161 
 
This view of objectivity cannot be easily ignored as a basis for the exclusion of prior negotia-
tions.It is indeed one with historical support.A specific application of the parol evidence rule 
required that declarations of intention (as are commonly contained in such negotiations) be not 
admissible.162The chief reason for their*380 exclusion is that they "set up a rival declaration 
of volition, coming directly into competition with the words of the document which alone is to 
be regarded as the legal act".163However, there should not be an absolute prohibition of prior 
negotiations on this basis.As has been noted by Collins, the exclusionary rule, in its broad sense, 
is indeed too broad.164And as Lord Nicholls likewise noted, there will be occasions where the 
prior negotiations are helpful and shed light on the meaning the parties intended to convey by 
the words they used.165While these prior negotiations may sometimes afford direct evidence 
of the parties’ actual intentions, that should not be a reason to prohibit their use because they 
would enable the reasonable person to be more fully informed of the background con-
text.166Indeed, one might go further and add that since evidence of subjective intention is 
important in misrepresentation and non-disclosure cases because the law operates an induce-
ment test,167such evidence, including prior negotiations, can be used for interpretation as 
well.While it may be argued that subjectivity is allowed in those cases because of the presence 
of fraud,168the fact that subjective intention is allowed in some cases means that, in the ab-
sence of fraud, some degree of subjectivity could be admitted, especially if it is only to estab-
lish the relevant background.The important point is to recognise that subjective intention is 
here used in interpretation for identifying the relevant background, and not to advance the 
parties’ actual intentions specifically. 
 
Latent and patent ambiguities 
 
Another specific reason for the exclusion of prior negotiations rested on the now-abandoned 
adherence to interpreting a contract literally.It used to be said that extrinsic evidence is only 
admissible to explain an ambiguity which is latent, that is, an ambiguity which is raised by 
application to extrinsic facts.169Thus the court inMercantile Bank of Sydney v Taylorspoke of 
how prior negotiations could not be "legitimately referred to, either for the purpose of adding a 
term to their written agreement, or of altering its ordinary legal construction".170The distinc-
tion between latent and patent ambiguities no longer affects contractual interpretation in 
modern times; it is now commonly accepted that extrinsic materials may be referred to in the 
interpretation of contracts even if the contractual words are not ambiguous.171It has in fact 
been shown that the distinction between latent and patent ambiguity is fallacious; all words 
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need to be interpreted in the first instance, thus implying some sort of ambiguity.It therefore 
makes little sense to distinguish between degrees of ambiguity with the result of a profound 
effect on whether the relevant context can be taken into account in interpreting the 
words.Corbin in fact characterised this recourse to ambiguity as one based on a great illusion 
that "words either singly or in combination, have a*381 ‘meaning’ that is independent of the 
persons who use them".172In any event, this aspect of the parol evidence rule is largely dis-
missed as being irrelevant today.173 
 
Restating the proper basis for excluding prior negotiations 
 
The general premise 
 
Taking stock, there remains at least one principle-based reason for the exclusion of prior ne-
gotiations, and this is adherence to the objectivity principle.The key, however, is not to ap-
proach the desirability of the exclusion of prior negotiations in pure binary terms. History has 
shown us that rejecting prior negotiations—simply on its status and without any understanding 
of the true underlying basis—is flawed.It is therefore on the basis of objectivity, supplemented 
by any substantively correct policy-oriented reason, that the true reasons for excluding prior 
negotiations can be understood, instead of prescribing a blanket exclusionary rule.174 
 
Assuming then that the exclusion of prior negotiations is properly explained by the rejection of 
the parties’ subjective intentions based on the objective approach towards contractual inter-
pretation, a proper understanding of the exclusion can be premised on an overarching "pur-
pose" test.Properly considered, the exclusion of prior negotiations comes into play only when a 
contract is being interpreted.This is thus not a rule exclusive to prior negotiations, and such 
negotiations are an example of evidence inadmissible under a broader rule concerning sub-
jective intentions.Prior negotiations may be admitted for rectification or vitiation of the con-
tract, but these have nothing to do with the interpretation of the contract.If support is necessary 
for this trite proposition, the Court of Appeal decision ofArrale v Constain Civil Engineering 
Ltdmight be cited; in that case Lord Denning MR observed that the exclusionary rule was only 
relevant where prior negotiations were being admitted to interpret the contract.175 
 
After we have filtered out the occasions where the exclusion of prior negotiations is inappli-
cable, we can then consider the precise ambit of the exclusion when prior negotiations are 
being used to interpret a contract.We start with the proposition advanced above that a key 
objective that the exclusion of prior negotiations enforces is the objection against subjective 
declarations of the parties’ intentions.Thus, if the "only" purpose of admitting the prior nego-
tiations is effectively for the parties themselves to tell the court what their intentions are, then 
the evidence will not be admissible.176An example is provided by the case ofRabin v Gerson 
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Berger Association Ltd.177In that case, evidence of counsel’s opinion on a draft deed was 
sought to be admitted for the purpose of informing the court of certain facts, such as the ex-
istence of relevant statutory provisions and the concept of a company with charitable objects 
taking a gift absolutely.178However, the Court of Appeal rejected these as being the true 
purposes of admission; instead, the court construed*382 the true purpose as being to show the 
drafter’s actual intention in order to avoid the effect of the written words he had used.179This 
avoids the law having to make very fine distinctions180and accords with the historical origins 
of the exclusionary rule. Historically, prior negotiations have always been admitted to prove 
the relevant background.There is no reason to stop that.The solution is to recognise, through 
the historical evolution of the rule, why it came about, and how to give effect to its underlying 
purposes.In this sense, there is no exclusionary rule specific to prior negotiations but the lan-
guage of exclusion can still be used insofar as it accurately describes the fact that prior nego-
tiations are sometimes excluded for specific principle-based reasons. 
 
Instances where prior negotiations are admissible 
 
Once it is realised that the reason for excluding prior negotiations is a narrow one based on 
avoiding reference to the parties’ subjective intentions, then it becomes clear why prior nego-
tiations are admissible in some instances.There is no longer any need to formulate so-called 
"exceptions" to the exclusionary rule, which are, in any event, difficult to reconcile with the 
basis of a rule that excludes prior negotiations per se.Prior negotiations will generally be ad-
mitted if they are being admitted to show the background to the contract and are not being used 
to shed light on the parties’ subjective intentions.Staughton LJ inNew Hampshire Insurance Co 
Ltd v MGN Ltd181explained the concept as such: 
 
"The concept, in my view, is as I there said, what they must have had in mind when, as I think, 
they embarked on making the contract.But it is not necessarily limited to the start of the pro-
cess.There may be evidence which comes later which will show the genesis, the aim, the 
background.But in the ordinary way, one should look at evidence which answers the question: 
why did these parties start to make this contract? What did they have in mind?I would not 
rigidly confine it; but that, as it seems to me, is the principle."182 
 
Applying the understanding of the exclusion of prior negotiations argued for in this arti-
cle—that is, not as an independent exclusionary rule against prior negotiations specifically—it 
is suggested that they will be admissible in the following instances. 
 
Fact and nature of negotiations 
 
Prior negotiations can be admitted to show that negotiations had taken place between the 
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contracting parties.It is even be possible for thenatureof the negotiations to be adduced in 
evidence.The only problem with such evidence is that they are usually unhelpful towards the 
interpretation of a contract.The fact that parties had negotiated, and even the nature of such 
negotiations (i.e. whether one party was dominant or not), is neither here nor there.Thus, inThe 
Raven,183the defendants sought to admit certain affidavit evidence and attendance notes*383 
which showed the plaintiff to be largely in control of the negotiations concerned.The purpose 
of this was to show that the plaintiff never demanded an outright assignment so as to justify a 
departure from the ostensibly unqualified words used in the assignment.184Parker J, while 
referring to Lord Wilberforce’s statement of law inPrenn v Simmondsand accepting that evi-
dence of negotiations or of the parties’ intentions ought not to be received, accepted that he 
could nonetheless find that the plaintiff took an active, indeed dominant, role in the negotia-
tions.185However, that was the furthest he would venture since the fact that the negotiations 
had taken place, or indeed their very nature, shed little or no light on the nature of the as-
signment concerned.A similar example may be found inRabin v Gerson Berger Association 
Ltd,186where the fact that counsel had advised and settled a draft trust deed was deemed ad-
missible, although such evidence was rightly said to usually lead nowhere. However, the 
content of the advice will not be admissible as they reflect counsel’s interpretation of the set-
tlor’s intention. 
 
Commercial purpose or business object 
 
Prior negotiations will generally be admissible to shed light on the "commercial purpose" or 
"business object", both being really examples of "background information".In many cases, 
they will be the most important evidence to emerge from the correspondence in the interpre-
tation of the contract concerned, but that itself does not justify treating them as a distinct cat-
egory in the admission of prior negotiations as was done inPrenn v Simmonds.187 
 
An example is provided byAG ex rel Scotland v Barratt Manchester Ltd.188In that case, the 
issue was whether a later agreement had rescinded or varied an earlier agreement.Staughton LJ, 
contrary to counsel’s submissions, treated this as a matter of interpretation, which required an 
ascertainment of the parties’ common intention deduced from the terms of the contract in light 
of the surrounding circumstances.At issue was whether correspondence between the defendant 
and the council, with whom the defendant had entered into the later agreement, was admissible 
in interpreting the later agreement.The correspondence was important because the council 
expressly stated that it was seeking legal advice as to the status of the earlier agreement, thus 
indicating that the later agreement was not intended to abrogate, rescind or vary the earlier 
agreement.These were clearly not "negotiations" in the strict sense of the word, but were cer-
tainly pre-contractual. Nonetheless, Staughton LJ accepted that the correspondence was ad-
missible.He said that it was not evidence of negotiations for the conclusion of the agreement 
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concerned, but rather was evidence of the aims of the agreement (and non-aims).189As a 
matter of principle, he stated that:*384  
 
"When one has correspondence immediately preceding the conclusion of a formal contract, 
which shows that the contract whilst intended to deal with planning matters was not intended to 
deal with the continued existence of a restrictive covenant, it seems to me proper, in accordance 
with orthodox doctrine, to take that correspondence into account."190 
 
If the perception that there is an exclusionary rule against prior negotiations is dispensed with, 
then there is no need for the court to draw such a strained distinction as to whether this cor-
respondence was prior negotiations or not. 
 
InJones v Bright Capital Ltd,191pre-contractual letters between the parties, which had been 
characterised by the defendants as being negotiations leading up to either an unconcluded 
compromise or the compromise presently being interpreted, was held admissible to interpret 
the compromise concerned.192The Chancellor held that these letters were admitted to show 
the "genesis" and "subject matter" of a particular paragraph of the defence which subsequently 
became a term of the compromise concerned.The letters showed the connection between the 
actuary’s calculations and explain the figures and other terms which appear in it; none was 
being relied on as an indication of subjective intent.193Once again, by not treating the exclu-
sionary rule as specific to prior negotiations, these situations where prior negotiations are 
admissible can be very well justified.They are admissible because they are not being used to 
ascertain the subjective intentions of the parties. 
 
Background information or surrounding circumstances 
 
Sometimes the content of the negotiations has been taken into account by the courts as the 
relevant "background information" or "surrounding circumstances" in interpreting con-
tracts.Flaux J has commented on this inExcelsior Group Productions Ltd v Yorkshire Televi-
sion Ltd194: 
 
"It seems to me that there is a very fine line between looking at the negotiations to see if the 
parties have agreed on the general objective of a provision as part of the task of interpreting the 
provision and looking at the negotiations to draw an inference about what the contract meant 
(which is not permissible), a line so fine that it almost vanishes."195 
 
However, if we free ourselves of the conception that there is an independent exclusionary rule 
against prior negotiations specifically, then this thin line becomes unnecessary to draw.Prior 
negotiations should always be admissible to explain the relevant background information or 
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surrounding circumstances unless they show the parties’ subjective intentions:*385  
 
Previous drafts: An example is where previous drafts of contracts are admitted in a few cases to 
explain the contract.196In fact, inKyle Bay Ltd v Underwriters,197Judge Jonathan Hirst QC 
went as far as to say that prior contracts are always admissible evidence of the factual matrix, 
even if superseded by the later contract, although the degree of assistance they can offer may 
often be slight.198For example, inKuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co,199the 
plaintiff sought to rely on the previous year’s quotation to interpret the currently expiring 
quotation, which was the basis of the contract of insurance between the parties.Rix J disagreed 
that this was prior negotiations and held that the previous year’s quotation was "the basis upon 
which the previous year’s contract was made".200He therefore thought it was legitimate to 
interpret the present quotation against the background of not only the expiring policy, but also 
the previous year’s quotation.201Indeed, Rix LJ inHIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v 
New Hampshire Insurance Co202held that it is always admissible to look at a prior contract as 
part of the matrix or surrounding circumstances of a later contract. This should be the default 
position if the starting point is that there is no independent exclusionary rule, and the reason for 
excluding prior negotiations is understood. 
 
Private meanings: Another instance of relevant background fact or surrounding circumstance, 
since qualified, arose out of the first instance decision ofThe Karen Oltmann.203The principle 
emanating from that case is that: 
 
"If a contract contains words which, in their context, are fairly capable of bearing more than 
one meaning, and if it is alleged that the parties have in effect negotiated on an agreed basis that 
the words bore only one of the two possible meanings, then it is permissible for the court to 
examine the extrinsic evidence relied upon to see whether the parties have in fact used the 
words in question in one sense only, so that they have in effect given their own dictionary 
meaning to the words as a result of their common intention."204 
 
This principle was regarded as incorrect inChartbrook.Lord Hoffmann205thought that this was 
an illegitimate extension of the "private dictionary" principle that was only available where 
there*386 was unconventional usage of a particular word.206Indeed, at the first instance stage 
ofChartbrook,207Briggs J would have treated the "private dictionary cases" as involving rec-
tification and not construction, had authority not bound him.208Instead, he was satisfied to 
identify as a limitation of the rule that "the private dictionary inroad into the exclusion of the 
parties’ negotiations from the admissible background ought not to extend to any case in which 
the word, phrase, clause or term is itself subject of an express definition in the contract it-
self".209 
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However, the scope of this factor should also be considered in light of the Court of Appeal 
decision ofProforce Recruit v Rugby Group.210In that case, Mummery LJ accepted the pos-
sibility of admitting prior negotiations in order to ascertain whether the contracting parties had 
in their previous correspondence made clear the meaning of the Preferred Supplier Status 
provision in the agreement concerned.In particular, Arden LJ in that case held that because the 
parties had used a very unusual combination of words (i.e. "preferred supplier status"), and 
those words are undefined or explained, it would be appropriate in these circumstances to 
admit prior negotiations between the parties to show what meaning the parties had attributed to 
the words up to the signing of the agreement.211However, she drew a distinction between the 
search for objective rather than subjective intention thus: 
 
"In admitting evidence as to those communications, the court would be hearing that evidence 
not with a view to taking the parties’ subjective intent into account for the purposes of inter-
pretation (a purpose precluded by the principles laid down by Lord Hoffmann in theICScase) 
but for the purpose of identifying the meaning that the parties in effect incorporated into their 
agreement in circumstances where the court was satisfied that on their true interpretation the 
terms of the agreement were to have this effect."212 
 
There was also a further distinction drawn between this situation and the usual situation "in 
which, in the course of negotiations, the parties agree a matter which is to become binding on 
them (only) when a written agreement has been drawn up and signed"; in the latter situation, 
prior negotiations would not be admissible.213Once again, such evidence should generally be 
admissible if we dispense with the historically inaccurate idea that there is an independent 
exclusionary rule against prior negotiations specifically.*387  
 
Objectively discernible meaning: It appears also that where the negotiations reveal an objec-
tively discernible fact (as opposed to subjective meaning), then the negotiations will be ad-
missible.It appears important that such facts and circumstances must be known to both par-
ties.214Hence, information such as particulars of sale contained in pre-contractual inquiries 
have been held to be admissible.215This may be the case even if the negotiations were without 




This article has argued that the exclusionary rule has a much weaker historical lineage than is 
presently believed.It certainly did not exist as an independent rule until, arguably,Inglis, and 
even then support for its independence was not strong.Its rise as an independent rule really 
came afterPrenn, the very case where Lord Wilberforce claimed that the rule has had a long 
following.Its uncertain history led to confusion about its proper principle-based justifica-
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tions.The truth is that the exclusion of prior negotiations was never regarded as a specific rule 
before the 20th century; if at all, it was a facet of the parol evidence rule.The parol evidence 
rule prohibited recourse to extrinsic evidence either on the basis of avoiding alterations to the 
written contract or, in so far as contractual interpretation is concerned, avoiding recourse to 
extrinsic materials to explain the contract in the absence of latent ambiguity.Both these aspects 
of the parol evidence rule probably do not survive at the present time.However, one princi-
ple-based justification is still relevant, and that is adherence to the objectivity principle in 
contractual interpretation. 
 
In summary, it is time to return to historical bases and not regard prior negotiations as a species 
of evidence separate from the rest.Historically, prior negotiations were not treated apart from 
other extrinsic evidence in so far as contractual interpretation was concerned.They were all 
treated the same with identical considerations from various aspects of the parol evidence 
rule.Paying heed to those aspects, and giving effect to the relevant principle-based justifica-
tions with appropriate policy-oriented ones, would serve us better than debating on the false 
premise that the exclusionary rule is aptly justified by its longevity.A limited, non-specific, 
exclusion of prior negotiations can be justified in English law based on existing notions of 
contractual interpretation.More accurately, it may be said that there is no rule specific to prior 
negotiations per se; rather, prior negotiations are excluded on the basis of a broader rule pro-
hibiting recourse to parties’ subjective intentions.The sooner we realise this, the sooner we can 
concentrate on the true reasons why prior negotiations are excluded, rather than be distracted 
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